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Abstract: Designated veriﬁer signature schemes allow a signer
to convince a designated veriﬁer, in such a way that only the
designated veriﬁer will believe with the authenticity of such
a signature. The previous constructions of designated veriﬁer
signature rely on the underlying Public Key Infrastructure,
that requires both signer and veriﬁer to verify the authenticity
of the public keys, and hence, the certiﬁcates are required.
In contrast to the previous constructions, in this paper, we
propose the ﬁrst notion and construction of the certiﬁcateless
designated veriﬁer signature scheme. In our new notion, the
necessity of certiﬁcates are eliminated. We show that our
scheme satisﬁes all the requirements of the designated veriﬁer signature schemes in the certiﬁcateless system. We also
provide complete security proofs for our scheme and prove
that our scheme is unforgeable under the assumption of the
Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem in the random oracle
model.
KeyWord: Certiﬁcateless Cryptography, Designated Veriﬁer,
Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem
I. I NTRODUCTION
In a designated veriﬁer signature scheme, the signature
provides authentication of a message without providing a nonrepudiation property of traditional signatures. A designated
veriﬁer scheme can be used to convince a single party, i.e. the
designated veriﬁer, and only this designated veriﬁer who can
be convinced about its validity or invalidity of the signatures,
due to the fact that the designated veriﬁer can always construct
a signature intended for himself that is indistinguishable from
an original signature. This kind of signature has numerous
applications, for example, call for tenders, electronic voting,
electronic auction, and distributed contract signing. Some
recent works about the designated veriﬁer signature are given
in [5]–[10]. The ﬁrst construction of the identity-based designated veriﬁer signature scheme was proposed in [12]. In
the identity-based setting, the public key is the identity of
the participants themselves. However, in the latter setting, the
trusted authority, known as the Private Key Generator (PKG),
This work is supported by ARC Discovery Grant DP0557493, Ministry of
Education of Jiangsu Province Grant 03KJA520066 and Xidian University’s
Open Grant of Key Laboratory on Computer Network and Information
Security of Ministry of Education of China.

can always impersonate any user, and hence, the problem of
key escrow is inherent in this setting.
Certiﬁcateless Cryptography was ﬁrst proposed by AlRiyami and Paterson [1] in Asiacrypt 2003. In contrast to the
traditional cryptography, this notion does not require the use
of any certiﬁcate to ensure the authenticity of public keys.
Instead, certiﬁcateless cryptography relies on the existence
of a trusted third party KGC who has the master-key. In
this sense, it is similar to identity-based cryptography [11].
Nevertheless, certiﬁcateless cryptography does not suffer from
the key escrow property that seems to be inherent in identitybased cryptography. In the certiﬁcateless system, KGC only
knows the partial private key of the user and the user must
use the secret value, which is chosen by the user himself, to
obtain the full private key. For more about the certiﬁcateless
system, one can refer the paper [1]. Some recent works about
the certiﬁcateless system are given in [2]–[4], [13], [14].
Our Contribution In this paper, we propose the ﬁrst notion
and construction of the certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer(or
CLDVS for short) signature scheme. We also provide a formal
deﬁnition of the certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature.
Our scheme is very efﬁcient. Nevertheless, as we shall show
in this paper, our scheme achieves all the required properties
of the certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature. We provide
security proofs for our scheme based on the random oracle
model.
Roadmap In the next section, we will review some preliminaries required throughout the paper. In Section III, we
describe our certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature. The
security analysis is also given in the Section IV. At last,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. P RELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 denote an additive group of prime order q and G2
be a multiplicative group of the same order. Let P denote a
generator in G1 . Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear mapping
deﬁned in [1].
Deﬁnition 1: Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (BDH) Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP, cP (for
unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ), compute e(P, P )abc .
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Deﬁnition 2: Decisional Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH)
Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP, cP (for
unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ) and h ∈ G2 , decide
whether h = e(P, P )abc .
Deﬁnition 3: Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (GBDH)
Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP and
cP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z∗q ), compute
e(P, P )abc with the help of the DBDH oracle.
B. Certiﬁcateless Signature Schemes
As deﬁned in [1], a certiﬁcateless signature scheme is
deﬁned by seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-KeyExtract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-PublicKey, Sign and Verify. For a formal deﬁnition of these algorithms, we refer the reader to [1].
C. Certiﬁcateless Designated Veriﬁer Signature Schemes
We assume there are two parties in the system, the sender
A and the designated veriﬁer B. A certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature scheme is deﬁned by eight algorithms: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value,
Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Sign, Verify and TranscriptSimulation. The ﬁrst ﬁve algorithms are the same as the
cetiﬁcateless signature scheme deﬁned in the Section II-B, the
other algorithms are deﬁned as follows:
• Sign: The signing algorithm accepts a message m, a
parameter list param, (SA , xA , DA , IDA ) of the sender
A and the designated veriﬁer B  s (PB , IDB ) to produce
a signature σ.
• Verify: The verifying algorithm accepts a message m, a
signature σ, a parameter list param, (SB , xB , DB , IDB )
of the designated veriﬁer B and the sender A s (PA , IDA )
to output true if the signature is correct, or ⊥ otherwise.
• Transcript-Simulation: An algorithm that is run by the
designated veriﬁer B to produce identically distributed
transcripts that are indistinguishable from the original
signer A.
D. Adversarial Model of Certiﬁcateless Designated Veriﬁer
Signature Schemes
As deﬁned in [1], there are two types of adversary with
different capabilities:
Type I Adversary: This type of adversary AI does not
have access to the master-key, but AI has the ability to
replace the public key of any entity with a value of his
choice, because there is no certiﬁcate involved in certiﬁcateless
signature schemes.
Given the public keys of the signer and the receiver with
system parameter, a type I adaptively chosen-message attacker
AI can ask the sign oracle and verify oracle in the polynomial
time adaptively. At last AI outputs a message-signature pair
and the new public key of the signer. AI is successful if the
message has not been submitted to the sign oracle and the

message-signature pair is valid under the public key given by
AI .
Type II Adversary: This type of adversary AII has access to
the master-key but cannot perform public keys replacement.
Given the public keys of the signer (and the receiver), system
parameter and the system’s master-key, a type II adaptively
chosen-message attacker AII can ask the sign oracle and
verify the oracle in the polynomial time adaptively. At last
AII outputs a message-signature pair. AII is successful if the
message has not been submitted to the sign oracle and the
message-signature pair is valid.
Deﬁnition 4: A certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature
scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptively chosenmessage attacks iff it is secure against both types of adversaries.
III. O UR S CHEME
In this section we will propose our certiﬁcatless designated
veriﬁer signature scheme(CLDVS). We regard it as the main
result of this paper. There are two parties in our scheme, the
sender A and the designated veriﬁer B, all the algorithms are
described as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm runs as follows.
1) Run IG on input  to generate (G1 , G2 , e) where
G1 and G2 are groups of some prime order q and
e : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear pairing.
2) Select a random generator P ∈ G1 .
3) Select a master-key s randomly from Z∗q and set
P0 = sP .
4) Select cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G∗1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Zq .
The system parameters param = (G1 , G2 , e, q, P,
P0 , H1 , H2 ). The master-key is s ∈ Z∗q . The message
space M is {0, 1}∗ .
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm accepts an
identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , i ∈ {A, B} and constructs the
partial private key for the user as follows.
1) Compute Qi = H1 (IDi ).
2) Output the partial private key Di = sQi .
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm takes as inputs param
and the user’s identity IDi , and selects a random xi ∈ Z∗q
and outputs xi , i ∈ {A, B} as the user’s secret value.
That is the sender A randomly chooses xA ∈ Z∗q and the
designated veriﬁer B randomly chooses xB ∈ Z∗q .
• Set-Private-Key: This algorithm accepts param, a user’s
partial private key Di and the user’s secret value xi ∈ Z∗q
to transform the partial private key Di to a full private
key Si by computing Si = xi Di = xi sQi and output
Si , i ∈ {A, B}.
• Set-Public-Key: This algorithm accepts param and a
user’s secret value xi ∈ Z∗q to produce the user’s public
key Pi = (Xi , Yi ), where Xi = xi P and Yi = xi P0 =
xi sP , i ∈ {A, B}.
Now, the sender A obtains his secret key SA = xA sQA
and public key PA = (XA , YA ) = (xA P, xA P0 ).
The designated veriﬁer B obtains his secret key
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•

SB = xB sQB and public key PB = (XB , YB ) =
(xB P, xB P0 ).
Sign: To sign a message m ∈ M for B, the signer
A computes the signature σ = H2 (m||e(SA , x−1
A QB +
XB ))
Verify: To verify a signature σ on a message m ∈
M from an identity IDA and public key (XA , YA ), B
performs the following steps.

•

?

•

1) Verify whether e(XA , P0 ) = e(YA , P ) holds with
equality. If not, then output ⊥ and abort.
?
2) Verify whether σ = H2 (m||e(QA , DB + xB YA ))
holds with equality. If it does, output true. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Transcript-Simulation: B can produce the signature σ̂ intended for himself, by computing σ̂ =
H2 (m||e(QA , DB )e(xB QA , YA )).

IV. S ECURITY A NALYSIS
Theorem 1: Our CLDVS scheme is a designated veriﬁer
signature scheme.
Proof. We note that the veriﬁcation algorithm requires DB , xB ,
where DB is the partial private key of the designated veriﬁer B and xB is the secret value of B. Hence, B can
always “simulate” a valid signature by producing a valid
signature himself. This is achieved by constructing a signature
σ̂ = H2 (m||e(QA , DB )e(xB QA , YA )). Note that the signature produced by B is indistinguishable from the one that
was produced by the sender A. Hence, no third party can be
convinced with the validity or invalidity of this signature other
than the designated veriﬁer himself. If the designated veriﬁer
has not generated such a signature, then he will believe that
the signature was indeed generated by the signer A.
Theorem 2: Let AI be an type I adaptively chosen-message
attacker against our CLDVS with success probability greater
−CM A
than SuccEF
CLDV S,AI , after asking qH queries to the hash function H2 , qS queries to the sign algorithm and qV queries to the
verify algorithm, then there exists an algorithm B who can use
AI to solve a random instance of the GBDH problem with the
qV
EF −CM A
1 ,G2
probability SuccG
GBDH,B ≥ (1 − 2 −qH −qS )SuccCLDV S,AI ,
 is the security number of our CLDVS scheme.
Proof. Given a random instance (P, P1 = aP, P2 = bP, P3 =
cP ) of the Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman(GBDH) problem,
we will show how B can use AI to obtain the value of
e(P, P )abc with the help of the Decisional Bilinear DifﬁeHellman(DBDH) Oracle. In the proof, we regard the hash
function H2 as the random oracle. We assume AI is wellbehaved in the sense that AI doesn’t repeat any two identical
queries.
• Setup: In this game, B will set the system parameters.
There are two parts in the proof, the sender A and the
designated veriﬁer B. B starts by set QA = P1 , QB = P2
and P0 = P3 where (P1 , P2 , P3 ) is the instance of
the Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman problem given to B.
Then the algorithm B also randomly chooses xA , xB ∈
Z∗q and sets PA = (XA , YA ) = (xA P, xA P0 ), PB =
(XB , YB ) = (xB P, xB P0 ). B will return all the parameters to AI .

•

Hash Queries: In this game, B will simulate the hash
function H2 . At any time algorithm AI can query the
random oracle. To respond to these queries algorithm,
B maintains a list H-list which consists of the tuples
i
, YAi ) as described below. The list is ini(mi , ri , σi , XA
tially empty. When AI queries the oracle H with the
request (mi , ri ), algorithm B checks the H-list:
1) If there is no item (mi , ·, ·, ·, ·) in H-list, B will
choose a random σi ∈ Zq such that there is
no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list. Then B adds
(mi , ri , σi , ⊥, ⊥) into the H-list and returns σi to
AI as the answer. Here the notation ⊥ means B
doesn’t know the corresponding value.
2) Else, there is an item (mj , ·, ·, ·, ·) in the H-list
such that mi = mj .
a) This item has the form (mi , rj , ·, ·, ·) such that
ri = rj .
If this case happens, B will choose a random
σi ∈ Zq such that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in
the H-list. Then B adds (mi , ri , σi , ⊥, ⊥) into
the H-list and returns σi to AI as the answer.
b) Otherwise, this item must have the form
j
, YAj ) which can only be added
(mi , ⊥, σj , XA
into the H-list during the Sign Queries.
If this case happens, B will submit
(P, P1 , P2 , P3 , ri /e(QA , xB YAj )) to the DBDH
oracle and the DBDH oracle will tell B whether
ri /e(QA , xB YAj ) = e(P, P )abc .
i) If ri /e(QA , xB YAj ) = e(P, P )abc , which
means ri = e(QA , DB + xB YAj ), B rewrites
j
, YAj ). Then B
this form as (mi , ri , σj , XA
returns σj as the answer to AI .
ii) Else ri /e(QA , xB YAj ) = e(P, P )abc . B will
choose a random σi ∈ Zq such that there is
no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list. Then B
adds (mi , ri , σi , ⊥, ⊥) into the H-list and
returns σi to AI as the answer.
Note that either way σi is uniform in Zq and is independent of AI s current view as required, so B simulates the
hash function perfectly.
Sign Queries: In this game, B will simulate the sign
algorithm. At any time algorithm AI can query the sign
algorithm and B will answer AI s queries. Since AI
is the type I adversary, AI can choose the public key
i
, YAi ) for the sender A. After receiving AI ’s choice
(XA
i
, YAi ), B checks
of the message mi and the public key (XA
i
, P0 ) = e(YAi , P ). If the equation does not
whether e(XA
hold, B terminates this query and asks AI to choose a
valid public key. Otherwise, B checks the H-list:
1) If there is no item (mi , ·, ·, ·, ·) in H-list, B will
choose a random σi ∈ Zq such that there is
no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list. Then B adds
i
, YAi ) into the H-list and returns σi
(mi , ⊥, σi , XA
to AI as the answer.
2) Else there is an item (mj , ·, ·, ·, ·) in the H-list such
that mj = mi .
j
a) This item has the form (mj , ⊥, σj , XA
, YAj )
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j
i
such that XA
= XA
.
If this case happens, B will choose a random
σi ∈ Zq such that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·)
i
, YAi )
in the H-list. Then B adds (mi , ⊥, σi , XA
into the H-list and returns σi to AI as the
answer.
b) Otherwise, this item must have the form
(mj , rj , σj , ⊥, ⊥) which can only be added into
the H-list during the Hash Queries.
If this case happens, B will submit
(P, P1 , P2 , P3 , rj /e(QA , xB YAi )) to the DBDH
oracle and the DBDH oracle will tell B whether
rj /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc .
i) If rj /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc , which
means rj = e(QA , DB + xB YAi ). B rewrites
i
, YAi ). Then B
this form as (mj , rj , σj , XA
returns σj as the answer to AI .
ii) Else rj /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc . B will
choose a random σi ∈ Zq such that there
is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list. Then
i
, YAi ) into the H-list
B adds (mi , ⊥, σi , XA
and returns σi to AI as the answer.
Verify Queries: In this game, B will simulate the verify
algorithm. At any time algorithm AI can query the verify
algorithm and B will answer AI s queries. After receiving
AI ’s request (mi , σi ) and the sender A s public key
i
, YAi ) chosen by AI , B checks the H-list:
(XA
1) If there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list, B
rejects (mi , σi ) as an invalid signature.
2) Else, there is an item (·, ·, σi , ·, ·) in the H-list:
i
, YAi )
a) If this item has the form of (mi , ⊥, σi , XA
i
, YAi ), B will accept it as a
or (mi , ri , σi , XA
valid signature.
b) Else if this item has the form of
B
will
submit
(mi , ri , σi , ⊥, ⊥).
(P, P1 , P2 , P3 , ri /e(QA , xB YAi )) to the DBDH
oracle and the DBDH oracle will tell B whether
ri /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc .
i) If ri /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc , B will
accept it as a valid signature.
ii) Else ri /e(QA , xB YAi ) = e(P, P )abc , B rejects it as an invalid signature.
c) Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
This simulation works well except that (mi , σi ) is a valid
signature, while σi is not queried from the random oracle
H. Since, H is uniformly distributed, this case happens
with probability less than 2 −qqHV −qS .

If B doesn’t fail during all the queries, AI can output a valid
message-signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) under the sender A s public
−CM A
∗
, YA∗ ) with probability greater than SuccEF
key (XA
CLDV S,AI .
∗
∗
Since (m , σ ) is a valid message-signature pair, which means
there is an item (·, ·, σ ∗ , ·, ·) in the H-list. By the deﬁnition of
the adversary model, m∗ can not be queried to the sign oracle,
so σ ∗ is returned as the hash value of AI s query (m∗ , r∗ ).
That is to say there is an item (m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , ⊥, ⊥) in the H-list
and r∗ /e(QA , xB YA∗ ) = e(P, P )abc . Since QA , xB , YA∗ , r∗ are

all known to B, B can successfully solves this instance of the
GBDH problem.
However, the probability B doesn’t fail is greater than
1 − 2 −qqHV −qS . Therefore, B can solve this instance of the
1 ,G2
GBDH problem with the probability: SuccG
GBDH,B ≥ (1 −
qV
EF −CM A
)SuccCLDV S,AI
2 −qH −qS

Theorem 3: Let AII be an type II adaptively chosenmessage attacker against our CLDVS with success proba−CM A
bility greater than SuccEF
CLDV S,AII , after asking qH queries
to the hash function H2 , qS queries to the sign algorithm
and qV queries to the verify algorithm, then there exists an
algorithm B can use AII to solve a random instance of
1 ,G2
the GBDH problem with the probability SuccG
GBDH,B ≥
qV
EF −CM A
(1 − 2 −qH −qS )SuccCLDV S,AII ,  is the security number of
our CLDVS scheme.
Proof. Given a random instance (P, P1 = aP, P2 = bP, P3 =
cP ) of the Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman(GBDH) problem,
we will show how B can use AII to obtain the value of
e(P, P )abc with the help of the Decisional Bilinear DifﬁeHellman(DBDH) Oracle. In the proof, we regard the hash
function as the random oracle. We assume AII is well-behaved
in the sense that AII doesn’t repeat any two identical queries.
• Setup: In this game, B will set the system parameters.
There are two parts in the proof, the sender A and the
designated veriﬁer B. B starts by set XA = P1 , XB =
P2 and QA = P3 where (P1 , P2 , P3 ) is the instance
of the Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman problem given to
B. Then the algorithm B also randomly chooses s ∈
Z∗q , QB ∈R G1 and sets P0 = sP , PA = (XA , YA ) =
(P1 , sP1 ), PB = (XB , YB ) = (P2 , sP2 ). B will return all
the parameters to AII . Since AII is the type II adversary,
B will also send the master-key s to AII .
• Hash Queries: In this game, B will simulate the
hash function. At any time algorithm AII can query
the random oracle H. To respond to these queries
algorithm B maintains a list H-list which consists of the tuples (mi , ri , σi , ci ) as described below. The list is initially empty. When AII queries
the oracle H with the request (mi , ri ), algorithm
−1
B submits (P, P1 , P2 , P3 , (ri )s /e(QA , QB )) to the
DBDH oracle and DBDH oracle will tell B whether
−1
(ri )s /e(QA , sQB ) = e(P, P )abc :
−1
1) (ri )s /e(QA , QB ) = e(P, P )abc , which means
ri = e(QA , sQB )e(P, P )abcs = e(QA , DB +
xB YA ).
a) If there is no item (mi , ·, ·, ·) in H-list, B will
set ci = 1 and choose a random σi ∈ Zq such
that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list.
Then B adds (mi , ri , σi , 1) into the H-list and
returns σi to AII as the answer.
b) Else, there is an item (mj , ·, ·, ·) in the H-list
such that mi = mj . If this item has the form
(mj , rj , ·, ·) such that mi = mj , ri = rj , B will
set ci = 1 and choose a random σi ∈ Zq such
that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list.
Then B adds (mi , ri , σi , 1) into the H-list and
returns σi to AII as the answer.
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c) Otherwise, as described below, this item must
have the form (mi , ⊥, σi , 1)(item of this form
only can be added into the H-list during the
Sign Queries). Then B returns σi to AII as
the answer.
−1
2) Otherwise (ri )s /e(QA , QB ) = e(P, P )abc , B sets
ci = 0 and chooses σi ∈ Z∗q such that there
is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list. Then B adds
(mi , ri , σi , 0) into the H-list and returns σi to AII
as the answer.
• Sign Queries: In this game, B will simulate the sign
algorithm. At any time algorithm AII can query the
sign algorithm and B will answer AII s queries. After
receiving AII s choice of the message mi , B checks the
H-list:
1) If mi has never been submitted to the hash oracle,
B will set ci = 1 and choose σi ∈ Zq such that
there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list. Then B
adds (mi , ⊥, σi , 1) into the H-list and returns σi
to AII as the answer.
2) Else, mi has been submitted to the hash oracle.
There must be an item (mj , rj , σj , cj ) in the Hlist such that mi = mj :
=
1, which means rj
=
a) If cj
e(QA , sQB )e(P, P )sabc = e(QA , DB + xB YA ),
B returns σj to AII as the answer.
b) Otherwise, B will set ci = 1 and choose a random σi ∈ Z∗q such that there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·)
in the H-list. Then B adds (mi , ⊥, σi , 1) into
the H-list and returns σi to AII as the answer.
• Verify Queries: In this game, B will simulate the verify
algorithm. At any time algorithm AII can query the
verifying algorithm and B will answer AII s queries.
After receiving AII s request (mi , σi ), B checks the Hlist:
1) If there is no item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list, B rejects
(mi , σi ) as an invalid signature.
2) Else, there is an item (·, ·, σi , ·) in the H-list:
a) If this item has the form of (mi , ⊥, σi , 1) or
(mi , ri , σi , 1), B will accept it as a valid signature.
b) Otherwise, B rejects it as an invalid signature.
This simulation works well except that (mi , σi ) is a valid
message-signature pair, while σi is not queried from the
random oracle H. Since, H is uniformly distributed, this
case happens with probability less than 2 −qqHV −qS .
If B doesn’t fail during all the queries, AII can output a valid
message-signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) with probability greater than
−CM A
∗
∗
SuccEF
CLDV S,AII . Since (m , σ ) is a valid message-signature
pair, which means there is an item (·, ·, σ ∗ , ·) in the H-list. By
the deﬁnition of the adversary model, m∗ can not be queried
to the sign oracle, so σ ∗ is returned as the hash value of AII s
query (m∗ , r∗ ). That is to say there is an item (m∗ , r∗ , σ ∗ , 1)
−1
in the H-list and (r∗ )s /e(QA , QB ) = e(P, P )abc . So if
B doesn’t fail, B can successfully solves this instance of the
−CM A
GBDH problem with same probability SuccEF
CLDV S,AII .

However, the probability B doesn’t fail is greater than
1 − 2 −qqHV −qS . Therefore, B can solve this instance of the
1 ,G2
GBDH problem with the probability: SuccG
GBDH,B ≥ (1 −
qV
EF −CM A
)SuccCLDV S,AII
2 −qH −qS
V. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the notion of certiﬁcateless
designated veriﬁer signature scheme and the ﬁrst construction
of the certiﬁcateless designated veriﬁer signature scheme.
We showed that our scheme satisﬁes all the requirements of
the designated veriﬁer signature schemes. We also provided
security proofs for our scheme in the random oracle model
and proved that our scheme is unforgeable to both types of
adversaries in certiﬁcateless model under the assumption of
the Gap Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem.
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